S E A R C H ( wut r u lookng fr)

Monday, October 5, 2020

Fragments and Essays on Representation in Film

Index: Fight Club /  Taxi Driver / Ghost in the Shell / Critique? 

A collection of Guattarian thoughts on representation as it appears in different forms in film presented in installments. 

1: the fighting in Fight Club is not representational; 2: unwoke Taxi Driver is more representational of underrepresented folks than woke Marvel films; 3: Film has never been a game of representing people, but precisely of illustrating the gap between the thing and and its representation; 4: Drawing from Shaviro's The Cinematic Body (1993), film is most interestingly conceptualized as affective and non-representational.

Installment 1...

1: FIGHT CLUB

1a: Introduction 

I've asserted that David Fincher's Fight Club (1999) is not a critique; not of capitalism, masculinity, homophobia, whatever, etc., - its about fighting, and that's about it

This is a position that claims Fight Club is not 'metaphorical' or 'symbolic' which at a glance appears naïve and counter intuitive. 

Though we must concede that of course a film as seemingly rich in memetic content as Fight Club must necessarily make use of symbolism and metaphor to convey some 'deeper meaning' other than superficial violence, we must importantly add that the presence of metaphor and symbolism does not necessitate that the violence, the fighting, the bodies, etc., in the film are reduced or flattened onto or into a metaphorical / symbolic register. 

In other words, fighting expressed in a symbolic register - as what other way is there to express fighting, especially when expressing it on film? - is not equivalent to symbolic material expressed through or as fighting. 

In fact, when one considers the narrative arc of the film, one sees that the fighting is anything but symbolic / metaphoric. 

More generally, we must also assert that when the medium of film is explored without appeal to 'social critique' and 'metaphor/symbolism,' we have more fun; we engage less in redundant anthropomorphic conceptions of film and society and instead learn more about the actual world - metaphysics (the Outside) and metapsychology (the Outside folded in), i.e. the threshold where the inhuman transforms into the human, and where the limits of human understanding into its own inhuman origins are experienced.

1b: Civilization 

In the cult classic film Fight Club, Edward Norton's character is fed up with the Sisyphean, quotidian drone; he's psycho-ideologically beat down - foreshadowing his physical beatdowns to come - by his middle class status quo bureaucratic office job and the arbitrary oppressive rule-set and lifestyle that comes with it. 

When we consider how this middle class office job meme by association and definition falls smack dab in the middle of the civilization bell curve - to the left of the curve being abject poverty, to the right excessive wealth (its called 'middle' class for a reason) - this amounts to saying that Norton's character is in large fed up with  civilization itself. 

Fight Club is then a rejection of civilization, and therefore signification, and therefore oedipialization, and therefore symbolism / metaphor.

In his Hobbesian-Rousseauean-flavored text Civilization and its Discontents and his Nietzschean-flavored text Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego Freud argues that civilization is the partial -renunciation and mostly-sublimation of violent and sexual impulses.

In Group Psychology Freud writes

“We have only to think of the troop of women…all...enthusiastically in love...who crowd round a singer...after his performance. It would certainly be easy for each of them to be jealous of the rest; but, in the face of their numbers and the consequent impossibility of their reaching the aim of their love, they renounce it, and, instead of pulling out one another's hair, they act as a united group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their common actions, and would probably be glad to have a share of his flowing locks. Originally rivals, they have succeeded in identifying themselves with one another by means of a similar love for the same object. When, as is usual, an instinctual situation is capable of various outcomes, we shall not be surprised that the actual outcome is one which brings with it the possibility of a certain amount of satisfaction, whereas some other outcome, in itself more obvious, is passed over because the circumstances of life prevent its leading to any such satisfaction

People who would otherwise fight for what they want tend to opt out of a possible fight by identifying with each other and a common goal, even if it means sacrificing their actual or full desire for something lesser, in order to extend the enjoyment extracted from the object or event. 

In other words, the group would 'choose' (submit to impersonal unconscious survival incentives is more accurate) to stay together and receive merely a portion of the pie rather than fight one another at the gamble of having all the pie or none of the pie (again, the 'middle' of the bell curve - "outcome which brings possibility of satisfaction" - wins out against the left, those who fight at high risk and lose, and the right, those who fight at high risk and win). 

As Hobbes’ banality goes, ‘the state of nature is nasty, brutish, and short; a war of all against all' where anxiety is excessive and paranoia is the rule. 

In this fictional state of nature, one may pursue his or her desire, and take what he or she wants – the whole pie - but one would always sleep with one eye open, forever wondering if someone stronger would not come along and take the pie from him as he himself had done to others (might is right mentality - or fighting - is not a fertile milieu for the growth of a population, but the 'middle' of the curve - constancy, consistency, etc., - is). 

Thus, as the myth goes, humans entered into the social contract (unconsciously guided by impersonal incentives to extend enjoyment extracted from resources on the one hand and minimize high risk of pain or death on the other) where they sacrificed some aspects of life - instinctual desire, the possibility of having everything they could acquire by their own power at the risk of death - for the feeling of safety and the reduction of tension more viable to population growth [some of this was taken from another essay of mine here]. 

Tl;dr: life is longer for all of us if we don't fight each other all the time. 

This is all a lot to say  'Civilization is the act of replacing disorganized, small-scale, short-time-preference in-fighting with organized, large-scale, long-time-preference fighting that economizes and outsources violence.' 

1c: Signification 

Civilization is signification.

Quoting some author, Freud once said - 'civilization began when man hurled an insult instead of a spear.

Language (long time preference) over action (short time preference).

For Freud and psychoanalysis, metaphor and symbolism - sublimations of instincts and impulses - are necessarily signs of linguistic development and therefore Oedipal level development (as opposed to pre-oedipal, i.e., schizophrenic), and therefore castration (as opposed to psychosis or hysteria).

As Deleuze and Guattari have pointed out when explicating Freud in order to critique him, schzios do not use language the same way neurotics do. 

They use language diagrammatically - to induce action, to produce affect; they operate 'on the level of word as thing' (intensity) as opposed to 'the level of word as sign' (representation). 

The schizophrenic is in contact with 'the real' in that, to use Lacan's language, their 'signifying chain has broken down' (or never been constructed to begin with...), and thus they experience states of raw (or nearly raw) qualitative intensities. 

A schizo hears a word and plays with the word in its mouth like its a handful of rock candy - 'Connecticut... connect-I-cut...;' experiences it as a grouping of phonemes, the physical feeling in the throat, the vibrations in the larynx, the rumble of air in the chest, or an image - a cascade of non-relenting flashing images of solar anuses. 

For psychotics language is a bodily experience, a physical affair.

The schizo is a body experiencing itself in waves of intensities.

Fight Club is a film composed mainly of sublimated, neurotic bodies - middleclass pencil pushers speaking and signing 'impotent' language - becoming violent bodies acting on other violent bodies, but as it is a film, the narrative arc or vector of change  (for Freud regression, Lacan a breakdown, etc., whereas Guattari and Land reject these simple models of temporality that from the start beg the question) from the symbolic/metaphorical register to the 'becoming-real' register can only be depicted in symbolic/metaphorical terms. 

Put generally, a film cannot capture the real other than in terms of everything and anything other than the real. 

Similarly, in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari remark that language is a unescapable, necessary evil that is never completely overcome, but only used to further deterritorialization (see more here).

To this effect, Norton's character is sick of sublimating and repressing his violent and sexual instincts as civilization requires, and gives into acting on them, but does so in a schizophrenic or 'split-off' (schized) way, through an alternative identity of Tyler Durden (the clinical origins of schizophrenia - a breakdown of the signifying chain, an attack on links, as violent and sexual instincts are found too intolerable to the ego and superego, and thus are split off and assigned another identity to give distance to the intolerable feelings).

Interestingly, where things get out of hand is when this 'regression' from neurosis to acting impulse turns into what it was originally attempting to escape; when the meaningless, loosely organized, small-scale, short-time-preference in-fighting violence of the Fight Club takes on a global-spanning, cult-like, terrorist level place in the world, and thus lapses into organized, large-scale, long-time-preference fighting that outsources violence. 

As we established earlier,  'Civilization is the act of replacing disorganized, small-scale, short-time-preference in-fighting with organized, large-scale, long-time-preference fighting that minimizes and outsources violence.' 

The 'small-scale' is important here. 

Freud makes the mistake (likely inherited from Hobbes) in Civ. and its Disc. of making war the bad guy (understandable as he has WWII on his mind, not to mention his backyard), but as many theorists understood better than Freud (Nietzsche, Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari, Land, Myself), War, or large scale organized group violence, is very much specific to human civilization.

That is, what sets civilization apart from non-civilization is how violent fighting is extinguished and economized.

The Fight Club turns into war, turns into civ; war against the machine turns into a new state war machine; anicivilization into a new kind of civilization; local anarchy into global state terrorism. 

As Deleuze and Guattari warn us, a schizo line of flight can re-territorialized as misguided, political violence.  

1d: Conclusion

The film is about escaping the quotidian hell of middle class life, a film about  'exiting language,' to use a Guattarian adage, to return to a pre-verbal reality of fighting and fucking, one that warns of exiting society or language too quickly as to return to it in an even sicklier way.  

But of course, the only way to display a change from representation to non representation is through action, or representation; fighting and fucking can only be represented via the medium of film, other wise it would not be a film  - other wise you just would just be actually fighting!

***

The comparison between Taxi Driver and Marvel films is from the start a terribly boring and unfair comparison. This is why my goal is not to compare the content or intent of two films as much as it is to use the categorically strange comparison as a vehicle for discussing representation in a way consistent with installment 1. 

Installment 2...

2: TAXI DRIVER

2a: Introduction

I claim Scorsese's 1972 film Taxi Driver is more 'woke' - whatever that word means - than the contemporary pandering film cottage industry brands such as Marvel. 


Put differently, intending to depict a progressive ethos can undermine the desired effect, while intending to produce a film devoid of any specific progressive ethos can prove to be more effective at displaying progressive ethical themes. 


Martin Scorsese, when asked why "his movies are dominated by male characters and show little interest in female stories" replied “That goes back to 1970. That’s a question that I’ve had for so many years. Am I supposed to? If the story doesn’t call for it…It’s a waste of everybody’s time. If the story calls for a female character lead, why not?” " (Indiewire article by Zack Sharf). 


In a separate interview around the same time as this ordeal, Scorsese lambasted the Marvel movies for not being 'true' cinema.

 

Considering these two incidents map onto roughly the same audience feeling criticized (mainstream 'woke'-leaning 'consoomers'), it’s no surprise that the Twitter hashtag for Scorsese synthesized the incidents together into the following narrative: 'Marvel has put more women and people of color on screen in the last few years than Scorsese has done in his whole life.' 


Some responded to this in defense of Scorsese - 'Scorsese funded this or that film organization that helped outsiders and up and coming artists break into the industry, many of which were women and people of color,' but we are uninterested in defending Scorsese.


What we are interested in, however, is exploring the Scorsese incident as an example of what I will describe as the mainstream 'woke' consumer tendency to endorse molar and representational solutions - which unbeknownst to them are antithetical to their very idea of social progress - while neglecting molecular processes that are closer to their idea of ‘progress.’ 

 

2b: Molecular, not Molar; Show, not Tell


Don’t worry, we’re not going down a jargon rabbit hole here. 


Here's a very vulgar reduction - real scholars turn away now - of the otherwise complex concepts of molar and molecular: 

The molar in Deleuze and Guattari's thought is opposed to the molecular. 


Though the two thinkers reject the equating the terms, in shorthand we can say that molar is similar to 'macro,' the molecular to 'micro.' 


Molecular revolution or micropolitics = radical novel practices that rupture the continuum of sense and order (what we're used to) thereby introducing previously unthought or unfelt ways of organizing desire and people - a body without organs ("Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly…Let's go further still, we haven't found our BwO yet" - pg. 150-151 A Thousand Plateaus, and see pg. 6 in my extended essay here for more on this). 


Molar politics are state bureaucratic mechanisms that ensure repetition of the same old same old while squashing anything novel that could lead to forces escaping from the state's grasp (Oedipal either/or as opposed to Asiatic Production / Disjunction Synthesis of or,or,or...see here for more). 


The molecular are processes of the multiple as opposed to the Molar which is unitary. 


Molar entities are larger aggregates composed of many things under a unifying factor such as the family, the state, the ego, etc. 


The micro or molecular is schizo and operates on levels of intensity and affect while the macro or molar is oedipal and works on levels of representation and information. 


The molecular is 'polyvocal,' that is, many voices exist at once without negating each other. 


The molar is 'univocal,' that is, the many voices are reduced to one voice that stands in or 'represents' the many. 

Though many of these statements would be found disagreeable by D and G scholars, never mind D and G themselves, when grouped together they provide a 'vibe;' a breadcrumb trail that leads us in the right direction (just as Guattari in his solo work tends to reiterate the same idea many times in many different technical languages, attempting to capture a living process not easily reduced to language...).  


If this all sounds like mumbo jumbo to you and you're wondering what any of this has to do with Scorsese, women, and Marvel, all will be explained momentarily.


The old adage in writing - which includes the writing required for film production - is that one should show not tell. 


To move the plot along in a thriller for example, rather than have a scene in which the main character voices aloud his discovery - 'Ah, yes, I understand now! So and so did this which means this!' - we should instead have a scene in which we as the viewer witness the main character stumbling upon a previously hidden piece of evidence that triggers a memory which helps the character make a new discovery, etc. 


That is, we should be shown events that register on an affective and narrative level, not relayed information explicitly and on a cognitive level; we should experience things in a way where the viewer pieces together the 'meaning' or sense themselves with the addition of an emotional investment and where the film is not encumbered with unneeded dialogue and dead screen time.

 

The problem with the 'woke' progressive narrative of 'Marvel has put more women and people of color on screen in the last few years than Scorsese has done in his whole life' is not that it is untrue, but that the method is trapped in telling instead of showing (a heuristic binary that corresponds to the neorationalists [proving through argument] vs. the libidinal materialist [creating affective fictional resonances]).  


That is, the Marvel narrative rests on the notion of  'more’ - number or quantity - and 'people of X and Y’ - category. 


'If Marvel has 10 of Y and Scorsese has 5 of Y then Marvel wins.' 


The complex process of social progress (bound up with aesthetic cultural production and perpetuation of hyperreal fictions) is reduced to a simple molar, univocal (large, whole, concrete, binary) game of 'more beats less.'


Univocal-representational thinking: we've heard it before - the argument is that certain groups of people need to be 'represented' in film (which was also a criticism of Marvel’s Dr. Strange which cast a white woman as a character originally conceptualized as Asian). 


A person from X group on the screen stands in for all people of X group around the world who need a strong figure like them to identify with, whether for self-esteem, moral support, or political representation (and remember the molar institution par excellence is the family and its cousin, the state; the molar is univocal or reduced to one and therefore oedipal, and 'identification' and 'representation' are two concepts undoubtedly bound up with oedipal development); the voice of many 'invisible' people is represented - to a degree - by the amplified presence of one highly visibly person. 


Unitary-monolithic-phallic-signifier stands in as representation of all others; many voices flattened into one, the mouth-piece of God. 


For an indisputable concrete example of this look no further than the scene in Marvel's End Game where literally all the female characters - who were just previously scattered across the large battlefield - with the aid of poor editing, seem to magically assemble for a very obvious girl power moment


Women of all backgrounds are represented in one concentrated moment of lip-service.


That is, neither the narrative nor the imagined physical situation within the scene necessitated or organically produced such a moment, it was clearly an intentional thought by the production team to throw the woke audience a bone (not that there’s necessarily anything wrong with that…). 


The film moment is uncoupled from aesthetic truth, from desire, and is instead the product of a team of marketers appealing to trends; a low hanging psyop. 


Marvel is telling you how woke it is with numbers while Scorsese, as we will see, is sharing with you an aesthetic vehicle produced by desire that captures some social realities


2c: Taxi Driver, A Woke Film?


Scorsese says the question of female characters in his film goes back to the 70s, so let’s go back to the 70s. 


Taxi Driver (1976) is one of his earliest films and certainly one that many people associate with Scorsese's name. 


Though the film follows a brooding, disgruntled, male - setting the course of countless movies like this to come (see my Joker film analysis here), it also features two lead female characters, and considering there are really only 4 main characters - Travis, Betsy, Sport and Iris - this is not an insignificant fact. 


However, this is still playing the silly molar game of more beats less - let’s get molecular.

 

Taxi Driver does not 'tell' you it’s a progressive film by appealing to the kind of progressive stuff the audience expects to see - 'we have 2 female leads!!!' -  it utilizes violence and dark sexual and racial social realities to rupture and shock the viewer into contemplating concepts and experiencing feelings otherwise left uncontemplated and unfelt. 


It's a fictional-aesthetic vehicle for capturing and reproducing reality.  


Whereas Marvel films take the tired structure of 'good vs. bad and good heroes prevail over bad villains in the end' and injects it with some new content - 'woke women and people of color' - which is ultimately a superficial marketing team spectacle, Taxi Driver digs in deep and presents important realities about women and people of color - not to mention what we might call 'male privilege' - that are uncomfortable to think about.


For those who have not seen the film, Travis is a vet just returned to the Big Apple from 'Nam; he's punch drunk, traumatized, schizophrenic, and in need of something to make cash and, more importantly, in need of anything to occupy his time as to keep him from going insane. 


He takes up the job of driving a Taxi and one evening a very young prostitute tries to escape her pimp by getting into his taxi only to be forcibly pulled out of the car by the pimp, Sport. 


Later Travis finds the 12 year old prostitute Iris and befriends her. 


Fed up with the crime in the big apple and looking for an object to receive his inarticulate male rage, Travis decides to kill Iris' pimp so that she can return to her parents and have a normal childhood.

 

A third wave feminist argument would claim Travis to be a patriarchal tyrant  projecting victimhood onto a woman in order to enact a savior fantasy of preventing an empowered woman from using her body as she likes. 


Meanwhile, a second wave feminist argument would applaud Travis for using direct action (as opposed to impotent activism) in turning against his own - another man - in order to aid an abused girl.


I think the former is academic ivory tower red herring intellectualization that neglects the material reality of populations and thus, as far as I am concerned, does not warrant a response, while the latter makes more intuitive sense (people will find fault with this dismissive comment, but the writer feels that no argument against the former or for the latter will be constructive or worthwhile).


This is without mention that the film deals with racism and masculinity in a critical context. 


The sub-plot of the film concerns Travis falling in love with a woman named Betsy. 


As the classic trope goes, Travis is enraptured by Betsy and very aggressively follows her to her work place to ask her on a date. 


She agrees and they have an OK first date and a terrible second one as Travis attempts to bring Betsy to a pornographic film theater where Betsy is disgusted and offended, and Travis  unaware of his transgression. 


In portion of film that follows, Travis cannot let go of the fact that Betsy refuses to see him and it is implied that Travis is resentful and feels entitled to something from Betsy (constant phone calls, sending flowers, etc.).

 

To be painfully brief - you'll just have to watch the film - by the end of the film Travis, in a wonderfully subtle scene, realizes the error of his ways - i.e. Betsy owes him nothing, he can't treat women like this, etc. - and kindly and heroically helps Betsy to her home without being intrusive or making her feel uncomfortable. 


Here Travis abides by the contemporary post-#Metoo sexual codes in that he accepts that as a man he shouldn't follow a woman to her work place, force her to go on a date, introduce her to pornography, or assume a position of entitlement wherein a woman owes a man something simply for the man's romantic effort (friend-zone / incel). 


That is, despite its reliance on masculine-hero stereotypes, the film is critical of what might be called male privilege in that Travis, who by woke logic could very well be a rapist or a pimp, learns through killing the rapist-pimp that he should treat women with decency.

 

A similar 'argument' (I use the term loosely) can be made for the film being critical of 'white privilege.' 


Taxi Driver gets called a racist film now and again. 


Tarantino (who is not woke and is not liked by progressives...) responded to this by saying the film is not itself racist but about a racist character. 


I argue this is untrue. 


As Lauren Price argues in her piece for Filminquiry, Travis doesn't use racial slurs like other characters in the film, drives to all parts of New York, and, unlike other drivers, explicitly states he has no qualms about Taxiing any and all people (though he does appear uneasy around people of color). 


One scene emphasizes this difference of Travis and others in a similar position as Travis. 


In this scene Travis picks up a man (ironically played by Scorsese) in his taxi who claims his wife is cheating on him with a black man which he refers to as the N word slur; he mixes racist and sexist discourses when, after talking about killing the black man, he utters the now famous line “You should see what a .44 Magnum's gonna do to a woman's pussy…” 


In this scene Travis appears incredibly uncomfortable but also not ready to confront the overtly racist and misogynistic man. 


The complexity here, in woke logic, is that Travis is not actively racist, but not actively working against racism. 


Here Scorsese, unintentionally consistent with contemporary wokeness, portrays a white male who fails to be an ally for people of color and women while also showing white racial paranoia (the porn narrative of the black male and white women; 'they’ll steal our women'). 


That is, Scorsese does not try to portray any sort of progressive fantasy but instead shows the nasty reality of the world, a nasty reality that would seem to validate the narrative and experience of woman and people of color (though it is up to them to decide if they are 'validated...), the idea that white men do not use their position in society to work against misogyny and racism, and that these people are wrongly treated.

 

2d: Conclusion 


Why is this woke? 


The word is nebulous, polemic, jargon, so I use it ironically, however...


What would be unwoke is if Taxi Driver depicted a knowledgeable white man free of racial bias effortlessly understanding and aiding women and people of color. 


Nothing is hated more by the woke than a ‘privileged’ person depicting themselves in a good light. 


In many ways Travis is a failure, and that is why he is woke by woke standards. 


Taxi Driver is old fashioned woke because it depicts flaws; it’s an example of Scorsese showing a harsh real world wherein a white man fights against child prostitution, learns to treat women appropriately, and fails to be an ally for people of color and in this way Taxi Driver shows the real situation of women and people of color by inducing an aesthetic affective experience. 


Marvel films, despite having more women or people of color, tell you about political tropes of women and people of color rather than depicting social realities.

 

Marvel is the simulation experiencing and reproducing itself; Taxi Driver is a glimpse at something other. 


Installment 3...

3: Ghost in a Shell 

3a: Introduction

Back in 2017 the live action adaption of beloved anime Ghost in the Shell became mired in controversy over 'white washing' - casting a a white actress to play an 'Asian' character (something we briefly covered earlier, when talking about Marvel - see more here). 

Much could be said about this - we could highlight the apologetic remarks Johansson made, point out that Anime regularly markets itself to Western audiences by animating Western-looking characters (and therefore Johansson and the character she plays look incredibly similar even throughout the many different anime adaptions), that the film industry game is played by elites who want to make money (and therefore will cast actors who draw audiences), or that original Ghost in the Shell anime creator endorses the position that the character Johansson plays is a cyborg whose physical form is, as the name would imply, a mere 'shell' being appropriated by a impersonal force, etc. 

No, we don't want to talk about any of this. As with our Scorsese being woke debate, this conversation is reactionary and boring. 

3b: Metaphysics of the screen/mirror

Oshii, the creator of the original anime, also introduces us to what we do like to talk about:

“In the movies, John Wayne can play Genghis Khan, and Omar Sharif, an Arab, can play Doctor Zhivago, a Slav. It’s all just cinematic conventions...If that’s not allowed, then Darth Vader probably shouldn’t speak English, either....I can only sense a political motive from the people opposing it, and I believe artistic expression must be free from politics.”

Though naïve, there is something of value to be extracted from this position. 

The difference between the actor and the character they 'represent' is precisely the birth place of the artistic gesture - the gap where aesthetics comes to life (or rather the gap wherein life expresses itself through aesthetics). For example, when Charlize Theron plays female serial killer Aileen in Monster we think of it as an impressive performance because a beautiful, high class, male-loving, civilized woman is able to portray the opposite - a low class, ugly, man-killer. She is tastefully able to transform herself into something she is not (same can be said about Christian Bale's losing weight for the Machinist, or gaining it for other roles). It is significantly less impressive when someone who already lives a certain lifestyle imitates or reproduces that lifestyle on screen. Having a serial killer portray or simulate serial killing is a snuff film; having a machinist portray a machinist in fact boring. 

For the actor or actress to produce an effect on the viewer through a process of learning and work - researching and getting into a role being other than what is, incorporating the outside, 'becoming a large body of water' as Nietzsche (the aesthetic thinker of masks par excellence)  puts it, etc., - to simulate an identity that is different than one's own identity, that is the 'work' of the art. 

The need for one to have a 1 to 1 correspondence between the actor / actress and the role represented on the screen betrays a strange return (of the repressed) to boring positivism, naïve realism, what Rorty calls 'the metaphysics of the mirror.' Or in other words - a lack of imagination. 

Rorty writes

"The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is  that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representations -some  accurate,  some  not...Without the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of representation would not have suggested itself.  Without this  latter  notion, the strategy common to  Descartes and Kant - getting more accurate representations  by  inspecting,  repairing,  and polishing the  mirror, so  to  speak - would not have made sense..." [see my old blog post here].

Why would we want this? Mirror metaphysics, with its need to make all things a copy of themselves, an 'apparent world and a real world' (Nietzsche), always feels dead. 

Those who desire such a thing unconsciously want all film to be nothing other than a re-enactment, documentary, or snuff film, all of which are boring or depressive and function to overload the collective cultural imagination with misery. It betrays a sickly post Y2K obsession with 'accurate information,' being right, having the legitimate position, etc. (see your 'film' critic who can't enjoy a film for what it is and instead picks apart logical details and internal inconsistencies, as if these somehow damage the movie's overall narrative, etc...). 

Baudrillard's information age of simulation. With this, art, the aesthetic 'spirit,' etc., takes a back seat. 

In fact, if art has any liberatory or progressive power it is precisely in the aesthetic gap of difference between the performer and the performance, a space that rejects the correspondence theory of naïve realism, etc., not the stifling, energy deadening metaphysics of the mirror that flattens all things to a copy of itself, not unlike the redundancy of signification. The need to depict tired pasts, stale presents, and boring, tried futures, instead of imagining difference, and allowing the aesthetic gap to generate the possible occasion of unforeseen strangeness that may breathe some life back into living. 

This is not to say that allowing John Wayne to play Genghis Kahn is somehow revolutionary. Rather, it is to say that being unconcerned with turning film into a mirror of the world is and instead working towards using film to loosen up rigid, archaic philosophical structures is likely more 'progressive' than adhering to some strange Oedipal-register representational politics. 

Installment 4...

4: A Brief, Inconclusive Conclusion

All that I have said in this blog entry can be summed neatly in the following passage:

"the...mistake of formalist and semiotic theory is to assume that, since the cinematic image is constructed (since it cannot be a direct presentation of reality...) it must be deciphered as a mode of ideological representation..." 
- Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body, 1993, pg. 36.

Or as I said earlier, because non-representation can only be expressed in representation, people mistake non-representation for another kind of representation.

Shaviro (pg. 2-6) understands film as not a way of repeating 'archetypes' or familiar tropes, but rather a space to subvert expectations, and play with tropes by scrambling codes. If the viewer knows the plot and the characters, use this shared, anticipated knowledge as a reference point to introduce something alien. 

That is, much to the effect of what I've argued here, one thing can be used to bring about its opposite; fixed territories serve as vehicles for deterritorialization; stability for instability, etc. - representation a medium for introducing that which cannot be fully represented.

However, for Shaviro, this is not a dialectical process. Film is an aesthetic medium. A film is a collection of images that are captures or simulations of events that occurred in 'reality' (whether with actors or computer generated characters) that by themselves are not connected but with the help of a team are threaded together with a narrative that relies on the viewer to partake in and continue the narrative-constructive process (pg. 14-16). 

These images, despite containing a significant narrative aspect, act on our bodies primarily and our minds (which is an incorporeal aspect of body) secondarily.

To this effect Shaviro writes:

"Images are neither true nor false...real nor artificial...present nor absent...they are radically devoid of essence...Simulacra...without hope of regulation or control..." (pg 16). 

"The cinematic image is at once intense and impalpable...images confront the viewer directly without mediation" (pg. 25); "Images literally assault the spectator, leaving them no space for reflection" (pg. 49)  (as in a train coming towards the audience that causes the naive viewers to react as if they are going to be hit by the speeding vehicle (pg. 32)). 

Two dimensional fictions (see Paul Virilio's short but informative books Lost Dimension and Information Bomb) effect reality by manifesting effects in a body in three dimensional space. 

As Shaviro puts it himself - 

"Cinema produces real effects in the viewer, rather than merely presenting phantasmic reflections to the viewer" (pg. 50).

The intellectual understandings rooted in representation - critiques of this or that, endorsements of this or that - these are present and real, but secondary to the visceral experience the film induces in the body (because the mind is just a feedback arc of the body's signals experiencing itself anyways...). A critique is always a reterritorialization of a line of flight; a coding up and shutting down of the actual force of change. 

Anyways, all the miscontextualizing and strawmanning of psychoanalysis aside, the book is a good take on a schizoanalytic framing of cinema as an aesthetic endeavor that is worth reading. 

Consistent with Shaviro's use of the concept of Simulacra in its relation to cinema, I end with a meme (a Simulacra):


Someone shared with me - I forgot who - that the irony here is that the Gundam brand was quite literally made by a toy company with the sole intention of making money. The supposed critique is just another marketing ploy...

This meme was going around a bit ago. The message is that the average viewer misses the critical message of a piece of visual media by focusing on the superficial spectacle. For instance, people like Gundam for the mechs, not the anti-war critique (or people like Fight Club for the fighting, not the anti-capitalist critique, etc.). The implication is that you should feel bad for doing so.

I'm here to remind you that there is no critique. Anti-war may be part of the narrative, but art is not just a critical theory argument set to or expressed in a series of image. A medium is only as good as its effects. If Gundam makes kids go out and wage war, despite its supposed anti-war rhetoric, it's not anti-war; if Gundam makes kids put together Gundam model kits and stay out of trouble, its an effective anti-war show...etc.

Schizoanalysis is about what effects an assemblage has on what another assemblages does, not on its modes of representation. 



 

Sunday, August 30, 2020

COVID Update from the (Fake) Frontlines

I recently reflected on my inpatient and mental health clinic experiences in Kurtz-Gradient: Do Long Inpatient HospitalSome Notes on Hell, DRM_ARCHATXTR.exe (Dream Architecture), and Some Notes on Land's Notion of Capitalist Efficiency and the Process. Synthesized - the inpatient and mental health clinic setting is an uncanny, surreal, horrorscape where the limits of the human, and therefore the inhuman, is brought to the forefront. 

In my general entry on epistemological errors The Minor Science of Caninepistemology / Doggypsychiatry, as well as my series on COVID and epistemology Viral EpistemologyViral Epistemology II: Quaternary Park and The Human Security System, and Viral Epistemology III: Science, the Death of God, and Mike Pence, I commented on the media reporting of the scientific understanding of COVID. Synthesized - the virus is by its nature a surplus beyond reason, science, and human control, one that deals with Nietzschean complexity, chaos, and chance. 

Today I will synthesize both my experiences in the psychiatry setting and epistemology - not unlike  how I started to do with Canineepistemology - to provide an anecdotal account of COVID. 

As I argued in the above entries, things are always more complex than they appear. Some will be exposed to COVID, not get it; some will be exposed to COVID, get it, and be asymptomatic and recover; some will be exposed, get it, be mildly symptomatic, and recover; some will be exposed, get it, be severely symptomatic, and recover; some will get it, be asymptomatic, and die; some will get it, be mildly or severely symptomatic and die. Some will attend high risk ares and not be exposed, some will attend low risk areas and be exposed, etc. Some will have compromised immune systems, or generally be at higher risk, and not catch it - or catch it and recover; some will have healthy immune systems, or be at lower risk, and catch it - or catch it and die. 

Molar statistics map well onto populations, but do not map well onto individual cases. Chance and chaos - random variation of nature, surplus of code - rule in this domain. 

For instance, I was recently appointed to the inpatient hospital ward to train the staff. In talking with the supervisor there I learned that 3 residents with incredibly compromised immune systems (literally near death in many ways) had contracted COVID, recovered, and returned to inpatient (and additionally, spread of COVID was quickly prevented from going beyond the 3 patients by - so it seems - sanitation, mask wearing, and quarantining). This of course goes against what we would assume - cramped quarters, locked doors, compromised immune systems, etc. - surely COVID will spread like wildfire and kill with certainty. The reality is is that these units are cleaned deeper and more often than other places, and traffic from the outside is limited as much as possible, so if there is a population of COVID negative patients, they will likely remain COVID negative. However, I have no way of explaining how these very physically and mentally ill patients did not simply die. I may not know enough about their treatment or care. 

What is more interesting is that several adolescents in the inpatient attempted to intentionally catch COVID in order to be discharged from inpatient, and all of them failed. 3 or 4 kids could not catch this stupid virus in a confirmed exposed unit even by licking the door knobs and floors. Strange.

On this note, I've been around high risk or exposed populations since the start of the quarantine, and have only ever tested negative. I know of only three people - all of which are once or twice removed (friends of friends) - that have contracted COVID, 1 of which was in her 90s and recovered without impairments, one of which was in her 30s and recovered without impairment, and one of which was in her 20s and recovered with slight shortness of breath. Considering men are significantly more likely to catch it than woman, and older people are significantly more likely to be effected than younger, this is all strange as well. 

Even though it's ripe with its own epistemological fallacies - my sample size is too small, I have no method, blah blah blah, etc., - I find it interesting to highlight how abstract molar statistical models often do not map onto intuitive personal experiences. I do however believe that through wearing a mask, using hand sanitizer, and not touching my face, I have done some things to lessen my risk of catching the virus. 

Anyways, I think this is a lot of words to say I am surprised I and many of the people I know and work with aren't simply dead...





Tuesday, August 25, 2020

Scattered Thoughts On Cute/Acc

"Cute" as found in Ethology: The Biology of Behavior Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1970 pg. 432

1: G(ossip)/Acc 
As I pointed out in my recent ode to Maya's love of McDonalds, I'm getting back to the roots of this blog - crudely filtering irrelevant and abominable low-pop-culture artifacts through poorly understood high-culture theory for the entertainment of a small most likely imaginary internet audience. 

In other words, I spend too much time explaining online jokes -  memes as the kids say - to people who who didn't ask.
 
Today's meme is 'Cute/Acc.'

The superficial reading is that Cute/Acc came onto the scene via Amy Ireland's twitter as a kind of humorous commentary on the multitude of  '[Insert Adjective Here]/Acc' derivatives that popped up around the internet, many of which were overly serious, self important, and lacking in the dark humor that cuts across most of the founding ACC texts.

That is, to counter the stale, overly academic miserable L-Acc and the boring right-wing-talking-points-dressed-up-like-high-brow-theory R-Acc alike - not to mention all the [BLANK]/Acc's in between that used some humor but frequently broke character to slip into some sort of serious project - Cute/Acc was - well, simply cute.

On another register, if I were to speculate as the psychoanalyst in training that I am, I would have to say Maya and Amy Ireland's somewhat apparent online (and in person? who am I to say, I'm trying to avoid being a nosy tabloid!) flirtatious romance influenced the creation of Cute/Acc to some degree, perhaps to the degree that Cute/Acc is merely an inside joke and any attribution of a 'deeper meaning' (a notion antithetical to most if not all of accelerationism) is misguided. 

2: On the Origins of Cuties
Luckily the origins of Cute/Acc are of little consequence for our goal today.

Our goal today is to assert that Cute/Acc is not merely undermining the misguided seriousness of much of the Acc stuff, but that Cute/Acc is, par the course of accelerationism, going 'even further still' down the Acc trajectory precisely because cuteness is the libidinal excrement of cold, horror; the product of random acts of bioviolence.

That is, Cute/Acc is more in line with other Acc than it initially betrays. 

In Ethology: The Biology of Behavior (1970 pg. 431-432), Eibl-Eibesfeldt writes 
"...we react almost automatically to certain releasing stimulus situations in a predictable way...likely on an innate basis...behavior patterns of caring for young and the affective responses a person experiences when confronted with a human child are probably released on an innate basis by a number of cues that characterize infants...specifically the following...1. Head large in the proportion to the body; 2. Protruding forehead...; 3. Large eyes...; 4: Short, thick extremities; 5. Rounded body shape...We find these objects 'cute' "    [see the above image for examples]

Cuteness serves an important biological function. Biological functions are honed through the feedback process of evolution. Evolution works through random genetic variation as opposed to anything teleological or theological. Random genetic variation is a 'mechanism' whereby nature, in its endless churning of cycling permutations, spits out a bunch of versions of a thing, many of which die, some of which live, at which point the living ones continue to reproduce and the dead ones continue to be dead.

To use Darwin's famous finches as an example - say the food needed to survive in an environment is mainly worms in a fallen tree that has rotted. The birds randomly generated by nature to have long beaks will be able to get the worms and live while the birds randomly fixed with other beaks will not be able to get the worms and will likely die. Thus, through random variation, we get an increase in the population of long beaked birds, a decrease in other birds, etc., and 100 years later we have a population of long beaked X birds in Y milieu, and little to no short beaked X birds in Y milieu. This is what we have come to know as 'survival of the fittest.' The random variation that fits with the environment best is 'selected for.' 

Though there are "spurious" traits passed down that appear to have a function but are in actuality relatively non-functional and merely smuggled in with attached code or functions by accident, this means the majority of traits passed down in populations serve - or at least have served - the survival of the organism. This of course means that 'cute' is a more than likely a trait that was passed down genetically for survival - or in other words, the 'cute' variations of the organism won out over the 'non-cute' variations (in the least, the variations of organisms that during their gestation period appeared more cute than other organisms of the same kind, as cuteness is associated with certain developmental stages as opposed to being a consistent factor across development). One theory for this, as mentioned above, is that 'cute' features trigger innate caring responses, increasing the likelihood that the organism will grow up as opposed to dying in its vulnerable young state. 

What is interesting here is that random genetic variation is itself very not cute. It is a cold, cruel, horrific, violent, ugly process wherein animals starve to death, or in the throes of desperation attempt to compete for food or space with other more 'fit' animals almost guaranteed to win the competition, often resulting in injury or death to the less fit animal. Just as a lump of coal turns to a cluster of diamond under high pressure over many years, a lump of cold and ugly turns to a cluster of warm and fuzzy; ugliness on one side of the process produces cuteness on the other.

3: Nature, Gnon, and The Eternal Return of the Cute
Nietzsche's most significant concept is arguably "the eternal return" which my undergraduate philosophy professor (who wrote his doctoral thesis on Nietzsche) explained to me as 'a pseudo-scientific materialist theory of nature that posits that if the material in the universe is finite, but time is infinite (or near infinite), then given enough time, the material in the universe will complete all possible combinations and start over.'  Deleuze, in his book Nietzsche and Philosophy describes this concept as a dice throw that demonstrates the possible combinations of chance and necessity that captures "a reproduction of diversity... a repetition of difference..." (pg. 46). 

From this 'materialist' theory of affirming the random generation of difference - what could be - while accepting what is - reality of the limits of nature - and the synthesis of the two, it follows for Nietzsche that one 'ought' to make the decision in one's life that one would always make given the choice. I argue this is a materialist reversal (or inverse) of Kant's categorical imperative, one that replaces the mandates of God with an affirmation of nature's random variation. Whereas with Kant one has to act consistently across all situations to remain ethical (never lie), and with God one needs to make decisions consistent with a judgement system based on an afterlife of reward or punishment, with Nietzsche one makes decisions based on whether one would want to relive this decision over and over again for an eternity, which means one wants to make decisions consistent with one's own system of not reward or punishment, but self-affirmation. 

Though Nietzsche posited the eternal return as beyond science, and criticized Darwin and positivist science throughout his career, and though, as Deleuze points out, Nietzsche's eternal return is not to be simply equated with thermodynamic theories found in physics, it does seem to be the case that the eternal return, with its basic materialist premise of 'finite material + infinite time = cycling of combinations of finite material,' is not unlike the random variation mechanism of nature. 

'Mad black Deleuzian' Nick Land has been compared to Nietzsche, written essays on Nietzsche (Shamanic Nietzsche), and his first book (Thirst for Annihilation) discusses Nietzsche along with Bataille, who himself was a sort of Nietzschean. Scott Alexander / Star Slate Codex writes " 'Gnon' is Nick Land’s shorthand for "Nature And Nature’s God." In other words, with the concept Gnogn Land is synthesizing Nietzsche and Darwin (and Kant) with Deleuze.

Though we cannot equate Darwin's random genetic variation, Nietzsche's eternal return, the thermodynamic theories of physics, and Land's Gnon, we can touch upon a common underlying theme - libidinal excess. As Land has explicated in his first book, part of the Nietzschean 'metaphysics,' for lack of a better term, is a libidinal economy of excess. A system always produces more than it can spend. Nature churns away, senselessly producing random variations of form and content upon a plane or in a milieu (to use Deleuze and Guattari's jargon). There is no God in this picture, only a feedback system that boot-strapped itself into existence and can't seem to kill itself fast enough to escape its excessive production of life, a life that, like cancer, spills over into death uncontrollably and gives back life.

So nature produces a million variations of some dumb thing, and the cute ones are selected for, and the non cute ones aren't. The cute ones step on the backs and faces of the non-cute ones, pushing them further into the mud. As Amy has stated herself - perhaps in her Twitter bio, I can't recall - warmth and cuteness are born out of the furnace of coldness (I'm paraphrasing).

Wherever anything is cute, there is surely a trail of bodies not far behind. Perhaps this is part of the misogynistic narratives of the seductive evil woman - Lilith, Medusa, the archetypes of the seductive spider-woman or the witch, etc., - found among all cultures throughout all times. 

Cuteulhu anyone? 

4: Post Script: Cute/Acc - A Dionysian Re-invigoration of Acc
Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt's 1970 book Ethology: The Biology of Behavior is an interesting artifact I'd like to call attention to. 

As I've written elsewhere, I discovered Deleuze and Guattari by accident after seeing a film and initially hated them, only to shortly thereafter find Anti-Oedipus in my psychoanalytic institute's free book shelf where I of course snatched it up and fell in love. Along with AO, I also snatched up the above book, by Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Both books were donated to the free book shelf by the same professor, who I have talked about here and here, a professor who was active during May '68, and likely bought these books in the 70s or 80s and likely donated them at the same time. I assumed this to be random, unrelated until I began exploring Guattari's solo work, where I encountered a diagram that looked familiar. As it turns out, the diagram was drawn by Guattari into his book and taken directly from Eibl-Eibesfeldts book! With this is mind, I went looking for citations throughout Guattari's work and to my surprise found that this Eibl-Eibesfeldt book was one Guattari's most cited books, and likely the one that informed the biological and ethological thinking throughout both Guattari's solo work and Deleuze and Guattari's work together. 

What are the chances of getting both books? I'm inclined to say slim. But chance and strange coincidence are where life really happens - the libidinal explosion of something strange out of the mundane. 
This is in part what Cute/Acc did. The cuteness undermined the stoicism of the left, right, and unconditional. 

From The Birth of Tragedy to The Will to Power, Nietzsche talks of 'the serious man.' In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he appears as the enemy of Zarathustra and the Overman. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche writes of this 'serious man' that
"Dialectical rigor...thinking seems to them something slow and hesitant, almost a labor...never something light, divine, something closely related to the dance and to playful high spirits. 'Thinking' and 'taking something seriously,' 'taking it gravely,' are to them the same thing" (138).
This man has no fun. Too angry like the right, too morose like the left. Both mired in boring resentment. This man - and resentment for that fact - is not cute. Not cute at all. 

Cute/Acc, in my strange reading at least, employs us to stop overthinking, stop being so serious. It employs us, through my connection to this Ethological book of Guattari, to return to the energy of crazed, dancing Nietzsche, and stimulating abusing Guattari. 

What was Guattari to Deleuze if not the cute one of the two? Though Deleuze embodied Nietzsche's Dionysian intoxication impulse by being both a drunk and the 'real' Nietzsche scholar of the two, Guattari was certainly the Dionysian energy embodied. Look no further than Deleuze's own words on the difference between Guattari and himself.
"He [Guattari] would have to be compared to the ocean, endlessly moving with reflections of light constantly breaking on the surface; he can jump from one thing to another, he does not sleep much, he travels, he never stops, never ceases. I would be more like the hill, very little movement, unable to do two things at once, my ideas are stable and whatever occasional movement there is is internal..." (Dosse 2011 pg. 10). 
Deleuze, the rigorous philosopher, Guattari the dancing ocean. One cannot help but think of the constant mentions of jumping and dancing employed by Nietzsche to capture the process of joyous life overflowing itself. 

This is all a lot of words to say that ACC loses its fun when it takes itself too seriously, and that perhaps we need to get back to 'saying stupid shit' and 'fucking around with the schizo-maniacal flow' as Guattari put it. Perhaps we need to keep our humor, and become becoming-cute.



Sunday, August 16, 2020

Kurtz-Gradient: Do Long Inpatient Hospital


"Look what it did to Kurtz, a special forces ultra-capital meat-machine hacked and cored-out by K-virus, touched by  a dark future, recycled through hell." 

- Cyberspace Anarchitecture

"Kurtz cauterizes his compassion, burns it out, argonizingly meticulous, becoming ever more methodical, efficient and relentless (on a cyberpositive slide). He explores hell." 

- Meat

1: 

As Robin Mackay and Ray Brassier point out in their introduction of Fanged Noumena, the 'Kurtz-Gradient' - a reference to Kurtz of Heart of Darkness / Apocalypse Now - is an important Landian concept, one that makes an appearance in the CCRU writings, and Land essays such as CybergothicNo FutureKataconix, etc. 

Kurtz-Gradient manifests in the most wild, haunted areas. From deep jungled Africa, to swamped-out Cambodia, to the sterile inpatient hospital. 

2: 

I've written on institutional mental health before - this current post will integrate previous posts with Kurtz.

In my DRM_ARCHATXTR.exe (Dream Architecture) blog  - a title that shares unintentional resonances with Land's Cyberspace Anarchitecture - I wrote about the surreal nature of the panopticonesque structure of the inpatient unit I sometimes visit for my day job; my point was that the architectural layout of the inpatient unit is already dream like, so when i dreamt of it one night, it was not distorted or exaggerated by the representation models of the dream process. That is, the inpatient unit is a certain kind of hellish nightmare.

In my Notes on Land's Notion of Capitalist Efficiency and the Process blog, I outlined how COVID19 accelerated mental health professional 'burnout' - a term for when when caretakers become physically and emotionally exhausted, lose patience with the populations they are supposed to care for, and begin to act out coldly or cruelly - which thereby leads to thoughts such as "Program would run better, smoother, more efficient, if it simply didn't have patients." In other words, a hospital could get more work done if it didn't have any patients to take care of. Paradoxically (which is how complex time or 'templexicity' works), the institutions designed to aid the repair of the human ultimately aids in the cold, zero-trending obsolescence of the human.

3:

Similarly, as illustrated above via the pull-quotes, Kurtz gets more and more "burnt out," "cold," and "efficient" as he traverses a surreal architecture, a hellish geography; as he flaots down the river (Hades).

This has all been on my mind as of late because I've recently been tasked by my bosses with  visiting the inpatient unit more frequently (as opposed to the half-way house type environment I spend most of my time in) in order to 'supervise' and 'train' the staff on how to better help the patients (the staff has slipped into doing the bare minimum to help the patients). 

When I arrived at the inpatient and began asking about protocols, methods, chains of commands - how things really tend to go 'on shift' - I felt like Capt. Willard of Apocalypse Now.  As Willard follows the river further down, descends into the jungle of chaos, deeper and deeper into the warzone, he learns more and more how the chain of command has broken down, how authority has collapsed; no more generals, captains, colonels, whatevers, etc., giving orders, only a free for all of uncoordinated soldiers taking the war into their own hands. 

Willard: "Who's the command officer here"

Gunner: "Ain't you?"

Willard: "Hey soldier - do you know who's in command here?

Grenadier: "Yeah..."



Yes, in the inpatient I got a glimpse of how bad things had gotten, how chaos had overtaken order. The patients had intimated the staff to an extent that the staff no longer felt comfortable maintaining any kind of healthy boundary. As the adage goes, the lunatics were running the asylum. 

Mirroring the above scene, when I asked the staff who was in command, no one could tell me.

4:

As many have pointed out, for Land, the Kurtz-Gradient is one of many materializations of schizophrenic collapse. Oedipal order - daddy and the family tree, commander the dog soliders who follow, etc. - fragmented into a collective free-for-all. The incest taboo broken. Do Long bridge.

To this effect, in the appropriately named Meat (Or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace), Land writes

"With each telling of the story Kurtz becomes colder, darker, more inevitable, fatally anticipating K-virus catastrophe, as if a tendril of tomorrow were burrowing back. Whe he found among these African or Cambodian aboriginals...reports of military bestiality, butchery, carnage, head hunting, collecting ears, severing the vaccinated arms from children. The Kurtz-process masks itself in wolf-pelts of regression, as if returning to the repressed, discovering a lost truth, excavating the fossils of monsters" 

Africa jungle, Cambodia river - how about inpatient hospital? Reports of bestiality, butchery - how about taking off all clothes and flailing on the ground because someone asked you kindly not to throw food at other patients? 

Each time the Kurtz story is told it is compressed and microsized to fit the dimensions of your television screen. Now its squeezed inside the walls of an inpatient hospital.

5 / Postscript:

As I began writing this, I put on a film on Shudder "Adrenochrome" that, unbeknownst to me, is centered on drug induced psychotic collapse of rival soldiers in California. Right as I finish writing it I encounter a scene that references Colonel Kurtz. Sometimes things resonate oddly. 












Friday, July 24, 2020

Libmat / Ratpack Gossip 2: Judgment Day - Terminator vs. Robocop vs. Jesus Christ

"Land was our Nietzsche...with....a writing style that updates nineteenth century aphorisms into...'text at sample velocity.' Speed— in the abstract and the chemical sense...[his] withering assaults on the academic left - academic Marxism – remain trenchant..."
- Mark Fisher, Terminator vs. Avatar 
On the aphorism

Two aphorisms from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil
"Objections, non-sequiturs, cheerful distrust, joyous mockery - all are signs of health. Everything absolute belongs in the realm of pathology" (Aph. 154 on pg. 86). 
"When the mind is made up, the ear is deaf to even the est arguments. This is the sign of a strong character. In other words, an occasional will to stupidity" (Aph. 107 on pg. 79).
Aphorisms are often best left as is, especially Nietzsche's.
They are already the distilled product of a much lengthier - in Nietzsche's case madder - line of thought, and their very strength lies in the fact that they do not over-elaborate what they intend to communicate.

In these ways they avoid language games and rhetorical pitfalls and thus maintain their power as a chaotic, diagrammatic creative force akin to a high blood-alcohol level mixed with a black magic blood ritual.

In fact, the aphorism is precisely that which draws the blood; it is an Occam's Razor that short-circuits formal argument, turning them into bloody back alley knife fights. It cuts up - or vivisects as Nietzsche is so fond of saying throughout his work - the cultural landscape and recombines it into something else, not unlike the Burroughsian découpé that Deleuze and Guattari decouple from its dadaist lineage in order to mutate it into assemblage theory.

As Nietzsche put it, an aphorism is a way to 'write in one's own blood.'

In other words, the aphorism is already the simplest linguistic form of capturing instinct, impulse, desire, etc. If the aphorism were a communication from the analysand laying atop the analyst's couch to the analyst in their chair, the naive psychoanalyst would foolishly feel compelled to have the patient expand,  associate, 'say more,' while the 'good' analyst - the analyst who has read Nietzsche and those select psychoanalysts who followed Nietzsche closer than Freud such as Jung, Adler, Rank, Reich, Guattari, (even Lacan who does not seem to like Nietzsche), etc., - the good analyst cleverly remains silent as they know their patient has reached the point they 'ought' to; they know that the entire purpose of the 'analysis' part of psychoanalysis is to break down (the very definition of 'analysis') bigger, complex, reified notions (language that is used to obscure one's desire, defend against one's instinct, hide one's feelings, etc.) into smaller, more concise, precise, meaningful (closer to 'the real') bits of communication.

This is all to say Nietzsche psychoanalyzed himself through the accelerationist 'method' - if we can say such a thing - of dispensing with the dead weight of language in order to 'pick up speed,' as D and G would put it, resulting in the the aphorism, the closest communication to the real there can be (i.e., schizoanalysis).

Despite all this, it is still helpful to talk about an aphorism, not in a way that attempts to analyze it, but in a way that attempts to add to it, or write alongside it, so here is what is significant about these two aphorisms distilled into one notion:
the power of playful, stupid, passionate dancing thought that both avoids and combats the dialectical argumentative rhetorical style.
Or what Deleuze and Guattari would refer to as 'nomadic' thought.

On being a dangerous idiot (T100, Robocop, and Jesus Christ)

Rather than shallowly refer to other thinkers, or belabor the point in my own words anymore than I already have, let's turn back to Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil:
"Let us be unphilosophical" (20)
"Moral indignation...is the unmistakable sign in a philosopher that his philosophic sense of humor has left him" (30) 
"Never avoid your tests...never remain tied up with a father land...never remain tied up with compassion...nor with a science..." (47) 
"A species of philosopher is coming up over the horizon...(they wish to remain riddles)...these philosophers of the future have a right (perhaps a wrong!) to be called: Experimenters." (47-48).  
"Investigate to the point of cruelty...the human psyche and its limits...time to grow a little cold" (pg. 51-55) 
"Critics...are from being philosophers themselves...Real philosophers are legislators...[who] grope with creative hands towards the future...necessarily a man of tomorrow...who rarely feel like lovers of wisdom, more like disagreeable fools and dangerous question mark" (134-135) 
"Dialectical rigor...thinking seems to them something slow and hesitant, almost a labor...never something light, divine, something closely related to the dance and to playful high spirits. 'Thinking' and 'taking something seriously,' 'taking it gravely,' are to them the same thing." (138)
Unphilosophical, fast, dangerous, humorous, foolish, cheerful, reality-tested, experimenters of the future, not slow, dialectical, safe, serious, morose, reality-resistant, animals trapped in the dogma of the present.  In other words, be "a schizophrenic HIV+ transsexual chinese-latino stim-addicted LA hooker with implanted mirrorshades and a bad attitude blitzed on a polydrug mix of k-nova, synthetic serotonin, and female orgasm analogs who has just iced three Turing cops with a highly cinematic 9mm automatic," not a Turing cop; a libidinally charged anti-heroe on drugs rather than a rationally grounded superman cop; The 'good' Terminator vs. Robocop (it is difficult to not notice the humor and absurdity apparent in the one liners and over the top action hero gestures of the 'good' T1000 as opposed to the neurotic stare of the liquid metal guy terminator in T2: Judgment Day who can transform into any shape and, by no coincident, decides to take the form of a regular beat cop, and the the cop from Robo cop who is completely miserable...).

Create (active nihilism), don't critique (passive nihilism) - or critique in a way that creates (philosophize with a hammer!).

On being a boring 'smart' person

If the rationalist is not the one doling out the science of the time - the master of all snakeoil salesman, the philosopher king issuing the mandates - he is a slave pulled this and way that by whatever the new science of the times says. He is at the whim of the argument, and whatever argument is most convincing dictates his thought and behavior. How sickly this is.

For example, I know highly neurotic, relatively prominent Ivy League professor - who I have talked about here - who teaches research methods at my small time psychoanalytic institute. He has been known to say, unironically, and without a glimmer of self-awareness:
"When the scientific research said red wine and red meat was good for you, I drank red wine. When the research said it was bad for you, I stopped. It takes a long time for research to find the truth. Sometimes what we think is true today will not be tomorrow. This is why we need good research, so that a society and its members can know what to do, how to act."
For this poor man, the locus of control - the will to power - is not found within himself, his body, his instincts, passions, etc., but solely on an ever shifting dialect of 'good and evil' handed down to him from on high, somewhere beyond his understanding - the secular god of positivist science. That is, when the will to power of some billion dollar thought institute says 'jump' he says 'how high?'

To go 'beyond' good and evil, as Nietzsche shows us, is to trust the instincts, impulses, and passions, not be torn this and that way by the argument of others. To go 'beyond' is to be Dionysian, less-conscious, intoxicated; to drink the wine and eat the meat and not care.

As I have shown recently, consuming food that's 'bad' for you and intoxicating substances have no 'argument' other than the very lack of argument, which is that they are enjoyable despite their harms, and as I have shown not so recently, this is the kind of desire that Nick Land - following Nietzsche of course - understands and correctly extracts from Deleuze and Guattari, who themselves followed Nietzsche.

Nomadic desire.

As Fisher says himself (quoting Lyotard's 'evil book' Libidinal Economy), in the earlier quoted Terminator vs. Avatar
"one can enjoy swallowing the shit of capital, its materials, its metal bars, it polystyrene, its books, its sausage pates...and because of saying this, which is also what happens in the desires of those who work with their hands, arses and heads, ah, you become a leader of men...: 'ah, but that's alienation, it isn't pretty, hang on, we'll save you from it, we will work to liberate you from this wicked affection for servitude, we will give you dignity.' And in this way you situate yourselves on...the moralistic side where you desire that our capitalized desires be totally ignored...you have to tell yourselves: 'how they must suffer to endure that!' And of course we suffer, we the capitalized, but this does not mean that we do not enjoy, nor that what you think you can offer us as a remedy...does not disgust us even more. We abhor therapeutics...we prefer to burst under the quantitative excesses that you judge most stupid. And don't wait for our spontaneity to rise up in revolt either." 
Why would anyone choose to not eat the fast food capitalism serves up? Or choose water when one could choose wine? Even Christians understood this to the extent that they made wine into holy blood so they could have a 'good' but passionate (of the Christ) impulse-based reason to enjoy alcohol!

Again, let us return to Beyond Good and Evil to end
"We are better prepared than any time has ever been for the Great Carnival, the most spirited Mardi-Gras laughter, the most reckless fun, for the transcendental summit of the utmost idiocy, for a truly Aristophanean mockery of the universe...Perhaps we can be parodists of world history...If nothing else living today has a future  - perhaps it bill be our laughter has one" (147).
Nothing too serious escapes from the near future.



Tuesday, July 21, 2020

Mc/Acc: Fastfood is the official fuel of libidinal materialists

"No two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other...the spread of McDonald's (a new one opens every three hours) is part of this worldwide phenomenon of countries integrating with the global economy and submitting to its rules..." - Thomas Friedman, 1996
I'm getting back to the roots of this blog - crudely filtering irrelevant and abominable low-pop-culture artifacts through poorly understood high-culture theory for the mostly imagined entertainment of a small internet audience.

Today the pop-culture is fast food music and the theory is libidinal materialism.

As I've shown, the energy drink Monster Energy Zero Ultra is the official drink of libidinal materialist (and accelerationists), while tinnitus is the official health condition of accelerationists. Today I aim to show that fast food is the official food of libidinal materialists (and accelerationists).

Libmat vs. Neorat

As I've written about in the past, Libidinal materialism or 'libmat' is often discussed in opposition to Neorationalism.

To give an all too rough and probably highly disagreeable definition: for libmat, affective and material forces (bodies, animal or otherwise) are primary, and the human is dragged along as a husk behind these forces. From this it follow that appetites and impersonal incentives are valued higher than arguments and agency which are viewed as redundant; for neorat - and honestly I don't really know, I don't read the stuff -  it seems they like to argue, and put faith in reason, logic, and debate.

Libmat is 'exit,' neorat 'voice.'

The 'libidinal' in libidinal materialism arguably comes from Freud. Though there is some debate around it, in short, Freud's English translators used the Latin term libido to refer to instinct, drive, desire, or life force.

In the metapsychology of psychoanalysis, libido (later reconceptualized in Greek as Eros)  is a binding force that is associated or synonymous with nutritional intake, sexuality, and pro-social behavior, as opposed to the death drive and its related Nirvana principle (later reconceptualized in Greek as Thanatos) which is the way entropy is territorialized or captured in a body and how it effects behavior and mentation. It is libido that binds and fuses the death drive, making the forces of death work in the service of life (what Nick Land refers to as 'making it with death.').

The materialism in 'libmat' comes from the thinking that material forces such as the body and outside, unknowable but experiential physical forces and their dynamics are the engine that drive and produce behavior and thought.

In addition to Freud, some thinkers that can be considered part of the 'libmat' lineage are Nietzsche, Reich, Bataille, Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari, all of whom are synthesized in Nick Land's thought in his early 90s essays, and his only book Thirst for Annihilation.  For these thinkers, reason is essentially just 'cope' for unsatisfied bodily drives, and arguments are 'oughts' that come from a slavish instinct to renounce the world as it 'is' in favor of a secretly secularized Christian fantasy.

In this sense, 'libidinal materalism' is a way of saying 'Freudomarxism without the cringey humanism and emphasis on dialectics.' In other words, for libmat, reason, logic, argument, are derived from and therefore analyzed back to bodily experiences, a premise neorat rejects.

Cigarettes, Fastfood, and Capitalism
Urbanomic's Twitter, run by Libmat Robin Mackay, posted this picture of infamous Neorat Reza Negarestani smoking a cig in front of a McDonalds for a humorous caption contest.
What's more interesting than all this introductory footwork - and perhaps more fruitful given the intellectual (lack of) rigor of this current medium (blogging) - is how libmat manifests behaviorally and socially.

My naive mind produces a crude example - smoking. There is no rational argument for smoking cigarettes, and there are rational arguments against smoking (it contributes to preventable deadly illness on an individual scale, in addition to increased rates of pollution on a collective scale; could be argued purchasing cigarettes funds a market that profits off harm, etc.), yet people still smoke. This is because smoking is, for many, highly enjoyable for both biological (simple chemical reactions) and social (in-group behavior) reasons. In other words, the 'argument' for smoking is that it is enjoyable to the appetites and drives of the human, and these appetites and drives will win over the 'oughts' of medical and environmental science and moralism (all 'reason') alike.

There is no argument for smoking unless one collapses reason into enjoyment and considers precisely the lack of a formal argument the 'real' convincing or driving factor behind smoking.

Broadly speaking, these sentiments remain consistent when applied to the libmat conceptualization of Capitalism. Where many see cold, cruel, human crushing evil, libmat sees a machine that is both the product of deep outside forces and that which produces these forces; that which games, hacks, leverages, shapes, etc.,  how the forces end up materializing in and through the human (what Deleue and Guattari describe as the re- and de- territorialization process of "internalizing it so as to better  rediscover it on the outside, in social authority, where it will be made to proliferate and be passed on to the children" AO pg. 78).

In other words, Capitalism doesn't need arguments to perpetuate itself, it caught on and, regardless of its moral compass, is highly resistant to any change counter to its interests regardless of whether the humans operating within the system act for or against it. In a rock paper scissors style game, the inhuman and desire beats the human and rationality every time (in true libmat fashion, I am not going over these topics to convince anyone to believe it, but only to highlight what libmats subscribe to).

The same that is said for cigs and capitalism can be said for fast food, which is arguably a sublimated form of cigarette that is, as shown by Friedman above, highly emblematic - more so than cigs - of capitalism. There is no rational argument for fastfood, and there are arguments against fast food (it contributes to preventable deadly illness on an individual scale, in addition to increased rates of illness and social stress on a collective scale), yet people still eat it. People eat it because it tastes good and leverages very basic reward / pleasure chemical circuits in the body. On a larger, collective level, the fastfood chain captures this desire, leverages this circuit, etc., and acts as a node for global capitalism, opening up markets between cities in different countries.

In his work on Templxity, Land conceptualizes the city as a "time machine." Years earlier, in Meltdown, Land conceptualizes the city as a heat machine - "The heat of food and sex" (and afterall, what is head but simply time concentrated). Channeling this heat - the libidinal flow of nutritional and sexual appetite - the fast food chain restaurant utilizes a mixed method of both deletion of and rearranging and re-purposing of cultural code (just as bio and techno virus does) in order to clear out old traditional culture and replaces it with new global capitalism.

As Land writes in Machinic Desire:
"Machinic desire can seem a little inhuman, as it rips up political cultures, deletes traditions, dissolves subjectivities, and hacks through security apparatuses, tracking a soulless tropism to zero control. This is because what appears to humanity as the history of capitalism is an invasion from the future by an artificial intelligent space that must assemble itself entirelty from its enemy's resources." 
As Friedman notes in the piece quoted from at the start, McDonalds has a history of serving to both sides of the culture war(s) - it is transcendental, base desire. It is the smooth loop, it plays both sides, scrambles all the codes.

McAccelerate 

In short, Libmats do not falter in the face of despair, they do not lament, they humorously transform destruction into geographically vast amoral enjoyment (or use libido to bind the geo death drive).

A cultural artifact of early K-time demonstrates this succinctly: see the masterpiece below simply entitled ''Fast Food Song" by the even more simply named British pop band "Fast Food Rockers."

The band itself is clearly a pastiche, kitsch, parody of itself, cashing in on capitalism's appreciation of self-parody, and the song itself (which someone should probably do a Jungle remix of this...) appropriates a traditional folk melody form (rips up culture, deletes tradition, dissolves subjectivites) and overcodes it with post modern content, lyrics that blend the heat of consumerism, food and sex into one salty, tasty, fried, libidinal flatline.

(Overtly sexual lyrics such as: "You like it you love it / You know you really want it. I want it I need it / Nothing else can beat it. Enticing exciting. Driving me crazy / Hungry to the bone. I think of you and lick my lips / You've got the taste I can't resist. Any Sauces? You're chunky and hunky  / I'm coming back for more (Hot Dog and burger). Just savor the flavors / Waiting at your door")

A core concept of the libmat thinkers - especially so with accelerationism - is that an individual is the secondary, derivative byproduct of alien forces, not the important locus of control and agency. As Land puts it in Meltdown, "what is playing you?" ('you' being, in CCRU terms, a "meat puppet").

For a fast food accelerate the processed meat puppet possessed with these fast food flows, look no further than Robin Mackay, director of UK based publican house Urbanomic (who publish CCRU, Land, and related acts), blogger, and self-referred libidinal materialist (and not neorat), who really likes McDonalds and junk food (see his Tweeter threads on the topic  - 1234, 5, 6, 7, etc.).

Robin Mackay is the individual human articulation of the collective UK musical articulation of the global food industry articulation of the human mental desire articulation of the inhuman bodies articulation of base material alien desire. 

There's a reason its called 'fast' food.

Garbage food is running out, can what is eating you make it through the drive through?











Monday, July 6, 2020

Some Notes on Hell

As I've written elsewhere, the 24 hour mental health clinic is a surreal, unreal, uncanny, dream-like place. This is especially so  when its populated by the same handful of faces - staff and patients alike -  coming and going at odd hours. 

Let me back up. 

To be 24 hour level of care you need to maintain a certain staff-to-resident ratio. 
Say you don't have the staff to maintain this ratio, say, perhaps because its a holiday weekend. The solution is that the state 'mandates' or 'forces' staff already on shift to work longer than they originally agreed to. 

Without getting too much into it - as of yesterday, in 48 hours I've worked 32.
By tomorrow I will have worked 48 out of 72. If I work Night, I have to stay for Day. Sleep slips to the back of line. My coworkers are in the same position. The same 4 or 5 people have 'held down the fort,' so to speak, over the 72 hours. All sleep deprived, caffeine charged, losing it.

I was just describing it to a colleague as Sartre's No Exit filtered through a fever dream streamed to a mid 90s screen. Sleep deprived, overworked psychosis sets in - I wonder if it's not the case that I'm on some directors set, playing a part I don't remember signing up for, like in the way that Ryan Murphy uses the same actors to play different characters both across different seasons of his shows, and within the same season. Or how videogame worlds are filled with skeletal code structures painted over with the same uncanny copy-paste skin graphics; the amorphous crowd in the background painted with same face.

I was just describing it to the adolescent residents - 'I wouldn't ever claim to understand how it feels to be trapped here, forced to be here, but I can tell you, I get a taste of the craziness when I spend almost all my time here.' I of course have the privilege of quitting, of walking off shift, of leaving, etc., (exit) that the residents don't (they only have voice), but unconsciously, in the realm of affect, this does not prevent me from feeling trapped, not unlike they do. 

I work 16 hours, sleep for 2, get up because I have stuff to do, work another 16. When I leave and when I return, I'm with the same people - the same staff, the same patients.

A particle accelerator of misery.
Hell is not other people, its the lack of other people, the lack of options.
Hell is voice, voice is no exit.








Sunday, July 5, 2020

Freudomarxism: CIA Psyop to Delegitimize Psychoanalysis?

"They don't realize that we are bringing them the plague" 
- Jung to Freud on the boat to America to meet William James 
The story goes like this.

By the mid 20th century, Freud and Jung's virus, Psychoanalysis, had spread throughout Europe and America, even reaching parts of South America and Asia.

This is not surprising when one considers Psychoanalysis' reliance on then convincing 18th-19th century scientific thinking to ground a biological understanding of the individual, its use of the medical Doctor-Patient relationship for a treatment that relegated the social realm to the wastebasket of mere superficial symptomology, and its abstract emphasis on expensive fees coupled with its concrete bourgeoisie history.

That is, Psychoanalysis gamed hard-formed, time-tested, preexistence structures and flows - both corporeal and non-corporeal - to spread itself through a global network of hosts.

As it spread - and as memetic viruses tend to do - Psychoanalysis patched itself together into a Frankenstein monster of 'conflicting' values; a patchwork creature of stoic, rugged, but intellectual individualist values underpinned by physical science that also dabbled in soft social theorizing through positioning itself as legitimate and sole possessor of a supposedly profound answer to the post-war question of collective violence and human nature.

For these reasons - among others (the more malleable a meme within a specific field, the more it can fit and fold into every hole) -  psychoanalysis had begun to exert considerable influence over the wealthy and socially visible in both Europe - as seen in Freud's relationship with the Bonaparte family who used their wealth and status to help Freud escape Nazi Germany - and America - as seen in the rich East Coast elite of Wall Street marketing firms and the rich West Coast elite of Hollywood film sets alike utilizing psychoanalysis to further their interests (and their synthesis, Woody Allen, Hollywood star and resident New Yorker).

Psychoanalysis was both pop-culture, high art, low-culture, hippy collectivist, emotional, anti-establishment, and bourgeois, ego-enforcing, and state sanctioned. Psychoanalysis had  it all.

Thus, being the rapidly spreading, (somewhat) all encompassing cultural force that it was, psychoanalysis posed a significant threat to the Marxist project which, during the tumultuous ideology-war years of the 50s and 60s, was vying for cultural space to spread out and breathe, the same space that psychoanalysis occupied in both a positive and negative register due to its unique characteristics outlined above.

In other words, it's one thing for a project to work towards negating another project (Psychoanalysis's bougie individual reductionism against Marxism's revolutionary collectivism), but its another thing altogether for a project to negate and affirm another project at the same time (Psychoanalysis against Marxism, and also attempting to solve some of the same problems and answer some of the same questions as Marxism). Psychoanalysis was not simply the right to Marxism's left, it was a competing left.

To put it another way, Psychoanalysis held values contrary to Marxism and its derivatives, and also enacted parts of Marxism's positive project on its own terms; it occupied space inside the left imaginary (anti-fascist social critiques of group think and violence, a humanist goal even), while also operating against the left imaginary from outside (offering conceptual models with corresponding political implications most of which do not toe the Communist party line).

If we take this story to be true, the question is then 'What is a Marxist to do?'

How about Freudomarxism?

The Freudomarxism of the Frankfurt school, I argue, was developed - whether consciously or not - as an ideological reaction to this threat, a clever move intended to impotentize psychoanalysis by folding it into and forever associating it with a kind of Marxism.

Why would this be an effective political strategy?

As media studies shows, and as Foucault tells us in his lectures 'Society Must Be Defended,' one does not control the discourse around a subject - and ultimately exercise one's power - simply by ignoring the subject altogether, or prohibiting discussion about it, one controls the discourse and exercises one's power by talking about the subject in a certain way. As the politicians say, 'get out in front of the story' to control the narrative, or what Fredric Jameson - who Zizek refers to as the only true Marxist around anymore - appropriating Stuart Hall refers to as "the discursive struggle over the delegitimating of opposing ideologies." One does not have to construct a meaningful project, one simply has to discredit the former or opposing project through language games, rhetoric, polemics.

But is there any reason to really believe this paranoid conspiracy theory?

For obvious reasons, the postWWII era was a pivotal time for thinkers and theorists. In the power vacuum birthed of the ending of the war, the shifting of alliances, etc., the political imaginary was charged with anticipations of what could be. If you were in political power, it was your time to make some moves. If you weren't in political power, it was your time to try and talk your way into power by convincing others that your values were the right and good ones, while those with 'real' power were the wrong and bad ones.

Excluding beloved Walter Benjamin, the half of the Farnkfurt School people care about - Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, Marcuse, and Habermas - all published half or more than half of their works in 1950 or after. Such influential works - works which happen to synthesize psychoanalysis and Marxism - include Marcuse's Eros and Civlization, and Adorno's The Authoritarian Personality. What better way to defeat what could be a political or theoretical enemy than by using it and its own legitimization methods to legitimize something counter to it (what in my naivety I will call psycho-Leninism).

On multiple occasion - Twitter, podcast with Justin Murphy, etc. -  Kantbot has accused the Frankfurt School, Marcuse in particular, of being a 'Fed' or 'psyop.' Similarly, on Twitter he shares his thoughts about the institutions of social psychology and their tendency to produce preprogrammed tropes that insidiously dominate our thinking and influence our behavior.

Kantbot is right.

As one blog points out (utilizing Wiki) "Between 1943 and 1950, Marcuse worked in U.S. Government service for the Office of Strategic Services (predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency);" as another points out "...then transferred to State. After leaving State in 1951, he received a Rockefeller Foundation grant (and even CIA has admitted that, at the time, the Rockefeller Foundation was closely tied to CIA) to study Soviet Marxism, and eventually wrote a book on the subject"

As one blog points out, the CIA takes French critical theory serious enough to read it (see the original document here www.cia.gov › CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030036-7). As two blogs point out, between 43 and 50 Marcuse worked for the predecessor of the CIA, and in 51 he received government funds from a foundation tied to the CIA to critique the USSR, a line of research which some believe had enough influence to aid in significant political leadership change.

None of this is super convincing, but it does indicate that Marcuse, who for me is the first person who comes to mind when one thinks of the misnomer 'Freudomarxism,' may have been playing a bigger political game than is initially apparent, and that it is not beyond doubt that the utilization of psychoanalysis could have served the dual purpose of disarming psychoanalysis of its power while also appealing to that very power. This would certainly not be at odds with the history of state powers using psychiatric or psychological means for control.

The question then is if the virus of psychoanalysis can break free of its tired psychiatry-antipsychiatry and left-right circuits and get back to doing what it does best, whatever that it means anyways...